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Commenting in 1944 on the future design of housing for post-war reconstruction, the 
British government‘s Central Housing Advisory Committee, an eclectic body of expert 
talents, noted that: 
 
The process of housing construction is developing in the direction of the greater pre-
assembly of parts of the house at the factory.  It is not yet possible to state with any 
confidence how far such methods can be carried with satisfactory results.  While, 
therefore, the case for entire prefabrication is by no means established, it is possible 
that in the future complete houses may come to be built in this way.
1
 
 
How should we read such a statement?  Stories about buildings, and thus their social 
meaning, vary considerably through time.
2
  Without knowledge of the ‗high-rise‘ systems 
debacles of later decades, we might wonder at CHAC‘s cautious optimism.  Yet we might 
ponder, too, that during the inter-war years site methods had shifted only ‗very slowly 
from making to assembling‘.3  Learning that earlier experiments with prefabricated 
houses had failed technically, were more expensive than traditional methods, and were 
remembered unfavourably by enthusiasts and consumers alike, acting as contemporaries 
we might then dismiss such forecasts as fanciful and self-deluded.
4
   Indeed, on being 
harangued by Picture Post (the exemplar advocate of reconstruction) one month later that 
‗we must work out some totally new way of building‘ ― demand the ‗prefabricated 
house‘ ― we might rightly conclude that we had entered a looking-glass world.5   
Technology is a social product: understanding the social dimension, it is argued, is 
crucial to our understanding of its success or failure.
6
  Housing, especially, has a close 
and intimate social meaning.  Of course, most of us have specific, personalised 
understanding(s) of everyday things: our homes included.  What we understand, 
individually or as groups, we understand through different filters, for different reasons, 
and with different priorities.  Thus, while technologists spent the war years 
enthusiastically investigating building systems utilising steel and concrete that used less 
skilled site labour to construct the external shells of houses, for tenants physical structure 
remained only immediately significant if it ‗was defective and let the rain through‘.  
Contextually, anyway, most householders were ‗incapable of imagining the sort of world 
where they would be allowed to choose the home they wanted‘.  External appearance for 
housing authorities, however, was important; new housing stock ideally had to marry 
with existing.
7
  And planners, architects and politicians ― experts generally ― it is 
argued, also had different group visions: lest we too readily conflate the widespread 
popular interest in housing at a time of acute shortages with shared professional pre-
occupations.
8
 
Yet the limits and range of shared social meanings are important to understanding 
technological development.
9
  Meaning through interaction brings agency, direction, 
cohesion.  It sets markets, creates networks and stamps trajectories.  But how is meaning 
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attributed?  First, there is a story of internal coherence, the basis on which we judge 
buildings or other products in themselves, how we comprehend their purpose ― 
aesthetic, function, economy, etc..  The second is the story of their external explanation, 
of causes and context ― ‗broader meaning‘.10   Both components have strong human 
agency: of commitment, rationality, necessity, expense, scarcity, etc..  This article 
explores the interactive nature of ‗shared meaning‘ across this divide between social 
groups, and the impact this had on the development of low rise systems housing after 
1945.  It will suggest that this ‗new‘ technology was widely and continually 
misunderstood and interpreted by different groups in very different ways, limiting 
agreement, product stabilisation and closure.
11
  This proved inimical to subsequent 
development.   
 
ACTORS AND CONVERSATIONS 
Writing in the mid-sixties, Marian Bowley noted that ‗innovations in structures and 
methods of design‘ had ‗developed very tardily in this country‘: evidenced by ‗woefully 
little general interest in research‘, in ‗economic rationality in design‘, or in offering 
customers choice.
12
  Particularly important here had been the separation of the design and 
construction functions, so neither architect nor builder had the incentive or authority to 
conjure innovation.   Even greater explanatory weight has subsequently been assigned to 
this ‗social‘ dimension of organisational interaction.13  If ‗successful innovation requires 
the coupling of the technical and economic, rather than being solely a matter of 
―technology push‖ or ―market pull‖‘, then inter-functional co-operation and 
communication offers the very force for change.
14
   This is perhaps even truer of 
construction, as essentially an assembler of other manufacturers‘ products: ‗really just a 
network and a set of lists, like a telephone directory‘, perhaps with ‗too many characters 
and no plot‘.  In this anarchic system, ‗common meaning‘ and ‗common understanding‘ 
were therefore at a premium;
15
 the ‗quality‘ of conversation (that is, information and 
knowledge) between actors having a significant impact on the force and direction of 
innovation.
16
   
Yet supplier-dominated concerns like construction, it is argued, ‗appropriate less on 
the basis of technological advantage, than of professional skills, aesthetic design,‘ etc.:17   
where design is seen as more an art than as a science.  If this was true of traditional 
‗bricks and mortar‘ construction, a sector exemplifying small, low-visibility, and 
cumulative change, was it also true of non-traditional, systems forms of construction?
18
  
Contemporaries argued not.  As one prominent building economist noted at the end of the 
war, there was ‗some reason for believing that at last … a genuine revolution in 
technique‘ was about ‗to take place.‘  Scientific discourse, too, was ‗swinging against … 
traditional methods‘ towards non-traditional methodologies.19   Such beliefs were 
certainly advanced by architectural theorists on other than aesthetic grounds (for 
example, in terms promoting ‗modernising‘ industrial efficiency).  These discourses co-
existed with increased technological investigation into new building methodologies. Each 
gave the other validity and vitality, even if the claims made were questionable.   
Beyond this, did non-traditional networks conform to the same ‗conversational‘ 
patterns between actors as in the industry generally?  In public housing contracts the 
customer was ‗not an individual‘ but a ‗complex system of differing interests‘.  ‗These 
client systems … consisted of both congruent and competing sets of understandings, 
 3 
values and objectives‘.20  Architects provided a powerful professional social filter: as 
intellectual initiators, and thus as interpreters of the client‘s fluid demands.  Historically 
they also led the building industry: from the architects‘ viewpoint, the construction 
process ‗was hierarchical both socially and in terms of working organisation‘.21   
Yet local authorities frequently did not employ architects directly.  Moreover, a clear 
majority of the low-rise housing systems introduced after 1945 was sponsored by 
building contractors or component suppliers.
22
  Did this mean that architects ― as 
professional gatekeepers ― were less influential in determining outcomes?   A 
preliminary review would suggest not.  Non-traditional housing was almost exclusively a 
public sector activity, where tenants‘ views (directly or indirectly) were not actively 
sought.  ‗Consultation‘ consisted of numerous educative exhibitions and a plethora of 
pamphlets and books to transmit an imposed experience.  The ‗community‘ anyway, 
apparently, was less interested in ‗planning‘, etc., than more immediately in ‗houses at 
any price‘.23  Neither were local authorities, as purchasing agents, actively consulted.  
Instead, they were invited to inspect and consume, advised by ministry architects, but 
otherwise largely excluded from the early decision-making process.
24
  Thus, the ‗design 
of social housing‘ was controlled ‗by the makers of social policy.‘25  It was they who 
instituted a ‗way of thinking‘ about future problems and what was possible, possessing 
and applying a ‗set of knowledge‘ and ‗expertise‘ that gave authority and direction.26  
Attention, therefore, has centred on architects as the instigators of systems methodology, 
although others ― such as politicians, government departments and national 
housebuilders ― are also cited as co-correspondents. 27  
From this, the historiography focuses on the role of ideas and myth; the binding 
together of mutual interests utilising a ‗misleading‘ hegemonic discourse.28  Here 
rationality is subverted and prefabrication is chosen over traditional forms of construction 
despite being more expensive, flawed and less popular with tenants.  Actor innovators, 
anyway, do not always treat consumer preferences as ‗unalterable structural constraints‘ 
on their own behaviour.  Technological trajectories can accord more with speculative 
‗early promises‘ than hard information.29  In this respect, of primary importance in 
determining trajectories are the a priori beliefs held by actors ― their problem solving 
rules, specific knowledge, etc, and the social/environmental hierarchy that determines 
which beliefs are privileged at a particular time.
30
  In 1940s Britain politicians and 
housing experts, it is argued, came to believe that a ‗technical breakthrough‘ in housing 
was necessary and had actually occurred, allowing them political and economic freedoms 
in terms of production that otherwise would have been closed because of acute factor 
shortages.
31
   Rationality and irrationality, it can thus be argued, existed in many forms 
when socially or politically contextualised.  The pricing mechanism, by itself, although 
important, offered only one check for decision-makers.  Others at the time included gross 
national labour saving potential, or the need to maximise housing output (from either a 
governmental or commercial standpoint).  Thus, what was rational from one viewpoint, 
was irrational from another.
32
     
If, therefore, common understanding between producer and consumer was only 
partially present (in that needs, expectation and promises overlapped), between   
producers (that is designers and builders) and policy-makers (politicians and state 
servants) a greater congruence existed.  But was this sufficient?  In the first decade after 
the war, the state licensed all new building work.  Thus it had a controlling hand. In 
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addition little ‗hard evidence‘ existed either against which to test the claims being made 
for non-traditional techniques, although early scientific evaluation did validate initial 
belief systems.  Yet there was an element, too, of wishful thinking in such assessments.
33
   
Indeed any reliance on myth suggests that ambiguity existed amongst and between actor 
clusters.  Pinch and Bijker argue that the technical stabilisation of a product ― that is the 
closure of controversy ― occurs not when all problems are solved, but when ‗relevant 
social groups see the problem as being solved.‘34   The remainder of this article will 
explore whether this occurred. 
 
 
PREFABRICATION: MORE IN THE MIND? 
Interviewed in 1944 on his return from a fact-finding tour of the USA, Sir George Burt 
stated that ‗if the Enquiry dealt with one point, it established that so far as prefabrication 
is concerned it exists in America more in the imagination than in practice‘.  Asked then 
whether the setting up of factories to produce prefabricated shells and structures in 
Britain would not assume continuous demand for years, he advised that: 
 
I think that this is one of the principal stumbling blocks so far as this country is 
concerned.  I have seen no prefabricated house which will be so popular as to create a 
home market which will justify the somewhat elaborate equipment necessary.  In the 
immediate post-war period it may be necessary to use a prefabricated outside structure 
to save site man-hours…. [but] I can see no permanent future for such structures.35 
 
Burt was not only a prominent national contractor; he also chaired the government 
committee then investigating alternative methods of house construction.  But his 
comments are contextually significant for other reasons.  ‗Modern‘ England, as Priestley 
recognised in 1934, was already heavily overlaid by American influences.
36
  And, in 
terms of prefabrication, historians have stressed the impact that the idea of America had 
in shaping the British psyche.
37
  It is easy to see why, when Picture Post, for example, 
argued that ‗Prefabrication had Cut Down America‘s Housing Problem‘.  Prefabricated 
houses were erected ‗in a Day‘.  ‗Your whole house may be erected in a factory and 
trucked to site, as has been done in America ... Millions of us will have houses like 
this‘.38    Nor was the architectural press exempt from this hyperbole.   Architectural 
Review, an early advocate of modern design, argued that success in America ‗hands us a 
sharp jolt on the chin.‘  Focusing on ‗prefabrication‘, and ‗the complete factory 
assembly‘, it went on to claim that ‗The phenomenal U.S. housing output is to be 
interpreted as an omen of the future… It shows that it is possible to produce houses 
quickly, with a high standard of performance and with excellent equipment.‘39   
Yet there was nothing extraordinary about these discourses.   Even stripped of its 
transatlantic focus, to the wider British audience such ‗adverts‘ spoke of what might be 
obtainable through British technical ingenuity if only ...  (just as British technical know-
how had triumphed during the war).
40
  Indeed perhaps the semi-illusory quality made the 
offer more attractive and magical.  However, a fascination with what was ‗possible‘ — a 
mutually accepted interpretation of what technology might provide — needs to be 
grounded against the public‘s ‗deep anxiety‘ about housing shortages, which formed the 
political backdrop.
41
  Commenting on public reaction to an exhibition on post-war homes 
 5 
designs, Mass Observation, the influential pioneering social research organisation, 
recorded that: 
 
People just wondered when all these things would be available, whether they would 
really be available at all.  As one young middle-class woman, married and homeless, 
said, ―They could just give me any of it, and I should think it wonderful.  Honestly, I 
liked it all.  I‘m so desperate for a home I‘d like anything.  I can‘t criticise or judge it 
at all – four walls and a roof is the height of my ambition.‖42 
 
 The ‗very nice if we ever get it‘, ‗very good, but the point is, how long will it take before 
they carry it out‘ mentality was evident elsewhere.43  Architectural commentators, judged 
by the plethora of validatory articles on prefabrication then appearing in the technical 
press, were significantly ahead of the profession or political opinion.
44
  The Royal 
Institute of British Architects had apparently been ‗ostrich-like‘ in its pronouncements; 
even in the last months of the war it was still writing reports ‗from a position deep in the 
rear‘.  The press noted, too, that ‗prefabrication had been too much on the defensive‘.  
Mistakenly, prefabricated houses were still not ‗put forward as a better method of 
building than brick and mortar, but simply as a method of building houses without 
employing bricklayers and plasterers.‘45  ‗We hardly yet know how to use it‘, opined the 
Architects’ Journal at the end of 1945: ‗Laboriously we imitate the old brick house in 
form and content.  Our prefabricated efforts are mere copyism, their explosive potential 
still unrevealed.‘46 
A consensus was lacking, therefore, over what should be valued or produced.  Early 
reports from the secretariat of the Burt Committee noted that: 
 
no proposed method satisfactorily solves the problem of producing houses cheaply.  
The methods suggested are complicated.  I think this is due to the fact that the simpler 
methods of improvement on the basis of existing practice have been exhausted, and 
that attempts are being directed to entirely new methods, not yet properly directed.
47
 
 
Others were harsher.  The Ministry of Works Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor, 
commented of existing inter-war systems that:  
 
Many alternatives were tried, and in one respect or another were found wanting.  
Some of the houses then produced turned out to be thoroughly bad; others proved 
more costly than the traditional houses, and as a result the alternative systems in use 
[by 1939] could be numbered on one hand and none was working on any large scale.  
If we consider the state of scientific knowledge in 1920, it is not a matter of surprise 
that the alternatives used were unsuccessful.  There was no basic scientific data 
concerning the properties of and behaviour of building materials except for a limited 
and very narrow fund of knowledge of their strength.
48
 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Burt Committee‘s initial temper was very cautious, 
evaluating and reporting on inter-war practice rather than looking to current and future 
research.
49
  Yet, as the Architects’ Journal commented, what purpose did this serve?  A 
‗far more valuable contribution at this point would be a report, less unadventurous than 
 6 
this first, on entirely new experiments ― especially those concerned with 
prefabrication‘.50   
If architects and builders remained uncertain of what or how to build, the community 
seemed equally bemused by non-traditional design.  One engineer, for example, reporting 
on ‗overheard conversations … at recent and numerous Housing Exhibitions‘, recalled 
that ‗misunderstanding and prejudice are about equally mixed in the public mind‘.  This 
was the product of ‗cellophane wrapped publicity campaigns‘ and the ‗deeply rooted … 
acceptance of brick-wall and pitched roof traditional construction … as the ultimate in 
building technique‘.51   Certainly, public responses tended to reinforce this view.  For 
example, numbers of people were ‗definitely put off‘ certain non-traditional types (for, 
example the Orlit and Unibuild) ‗simply because the roof was flat.‘  Yet the Orlit was 
also the most popular of house types then being displayed by the Ministry of Health.  At 
least it looked ‗permanent‘, ‗attractive‘, ‗spacious‘.  Steel and asbestos-cement clad 
houses, by contrast, (the British Steel and Braithwaite) were viewed negatively, as being 
‗cheerless‘, ‗cold‘ and ‗barracky‘ ― ‗imagine rows and rows of them‘.  Indeed, on all 
non-traditional types, ‗by far and away the most unpopular comment was on the external 
appearance of the houses‘.  Within a ‗comparatively low level of positive interest‘ 
generally, a ‗quite like them if I could get nothing else, but they‘ve no individuality‘ view 
dominated in the public mind.
52
  
 
Insert photos Orlit (Figure 1) and Braithwaite (Figure 2) 
 
Non-traditional houses thus continued to be viewed, as they had in the inter-war 
period, as ‗makeshift‘ or ‗temporary‘, where local authorities saw them as ‗ten year‘ 
expedients after which the government would ‗take the damned things away‘.53  Indeed 
misunderstanding, apparently, was endemic: ‗much nonsense‘ being ‗talked about 
prefabrication, chiefly because the meaning of the word has not always been fully 
understood‘.54  Did it mean, as was commonly implied, ‗the manufacture of the complete 
house and its rapid and mechanical erection on site‘, or rather, as the Burt Committee and 
many architectural opinion-formers would rather have it, ‗the application of certain 
factory methods in the mass production of certain component parts, thereby reducing site 
costs‘ for everyone?55  Apologists for traditional methods again blamed the ‗confusion of 
thought‘ on the ‗political propagandists‘ of prefabrication: 
 
They insist on representing it as a technique providing a ready-made solution to the 
housing problem, gifted by progressive scientific thinkers to a grateful nation, but 
rejected by a backward and reactionary building industry, intent on preserving intact 
the twin citadels of craft monopoly and swollen profit.  The public has been led to 
suspect that houses might now be rolling off the production line like typewriters or 
motor cars, were it not for the hidden and frustrating hand of vested interest.
56
 
 
Contextually it is easy to see why ‗traditionalists‘ felt themselves to be under siege, 
and prefabrication discourse thus privileged.  The war years had heavily distorted the 
building industry.  Labour productivity fell markedly, and remained stubbornly below 
pre-war levels after 1945.  As demand for housing soared, one consequence was that the 
industry was viewed by politicians, economists and by scientific advisors alike as 
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‗backward‘ and in crisis:57 technically deficient, conservative in its use of mechanical 
plant, poorly trained, ignorant of recent research and resistant to the use of ‗new 
methods‘.58  Bevan, as the minister responsible for housing, thought it ‗vital‘ to provide 
an external ‗stimulus to the building industry from outside … by introducing new 
techniques‘.  Both he and Morrison, then in charge of co-ordinating domestic policy, 
understood permanent prefabrication in terms of a ‗modern‘ alternative providing 
‗competition for construction.‘59  Cautiously stressing what had ‗been tested and found 
by experience to be good‘ acquired an instinctive dissonance against this rhetoric.60   
During the war the only development licences issued were for prefabricated or other 
experimental methods of building.  Effectively this became the only game in town.  Thus, 
the architect Richard Sheppard, surveying wartime developments, could justifiably 
comment in glowing terms on the much publicised proliferation of new prefabricated 
designs.
61
  Sheppard favoured collaborative design, bringing together architect, 
production engineer, planner and structural engineer, replete with an ongoing scientific 
investigation into building materials and performance.
62
  Indeed, the aggressive cultural 
promotion of new methods by certain architects and builders, the technocratic faith in 
experts, and the advance of scientific investigation, walked hand in hand.
63
  The ‗normal 
method of evolution of new forms of building‘ was a ‗trial and error‘ process, taking 
considerable time.  But time, it was argued, was now simply not available.
 64
  Science and 
technology offered an alternative path.   
Yet the limits that the architectural modern movement and scientific influence had in 
redefining the house can be measured by looking briefly at what was actually 
constructed.  The majority of systems houses built after 1945 were concrete based (either 
cast in situ or prefabricated); second in popularity were those with a steel frame.  Two 
builders (Wimpey and Laing) between them constructed a third of the 271,000 non-
traditionals built in England and Wales in the ten years after the war: and both house 
types were cast in situ.
 65
  There was nothing new about such systems.  Some 2,000 
Laing‘s ‗Easiform‘ houses had been constructed before 1939; and slightly fewer ‗no 
fines‘ (although not by Wimpey).66   Both Laing and Wimpey were major speculative 
builders, initially producing non-traditionals because as ‗normal building was expected to 
be limited by lack of traditional resources, it offered the prospect of a market.‘67   Neither 
house when assessed by the Burt Committee in 1944, was thought exceptional or worthy 
of praise.  Instead they were judged ‗a satisfactory alternative, if properly used, to 
brickwork‘, but ‗not technically outstanding in such a way as to deserve special 
treatment.‘  Much greater interest, for example was shown in steel framed factory-
manufactured structures.  It was the latter that was preferenced developmentally, for it 
was considered that the ‗steel frame might form the basis of a true shop-fabricated 
demountable house.‘68   This belief that the output of the building industry could ‗only be 
increased by using new [factory] methods‘ was deeply ingrained within the political 
structure also, so that early setbacks were discounted.  Indeed considerable 
disappointment was expressed that too many of the systems being introduced ‗did not 
comply with the principles of prefabrication‘, and ‗represented merely a method of 
construction‘.69  All systems construction was justified by the operating premise of its 
greater efficient use of scarce site labour.  But the power of the ideal ― that is shop-
based prefabrication ― flagged a heavy discrepancy between what was desired and what 
was finally produced.   
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Insert Wimpey (Figure 3) photo  
 
Yet the broader idea of ‗new methods‘ was certainly pinned, if not driven home, by 
the rapid expansion of systems construction.  Although later falling, by 1948 non-
traditional construction accounted for one third of all public sector completions, a figure 
not subsequently exceeded until the high-rise boom of the late 1960s.
70
  Indeed at one 
stage the Cabinet considered that some 75 per cent of permanent homes would be 
constructed by such ‗labour saving methods.‘71  Nevertheless, even when successful, the 
governing philosophy of systems construction remained ambiguous — that is in terms of 
closure and stabilization through time.  The point is again well illustrated by looking at 
cast in situ housing.  The ‗no-fines‘ and Easiform systems remained popular well into the 
1960s and 1970s.  In these years Wimpey alone was casting on average some 8,000 units 
per annum in England and Wales.  ‗No fines‘ options proved to be equally popular in 
Scotland.  By and large such houses performed well:
 ‗no fines‘ concrete walls were 
‗quickly built with very little skilled labour‘. 72  Thus it was well liked by local 
authorities.  But this popularity also rested with the appearance of ‗no fines‘ construction, 
because once rendered externally, it passed for a traditionally built brick house.  As Mass 
Observation observed, ‗the less a prefab. looks like a prefab. the more people like it‘.  
Some local authorities ‗simply switched from brick to ―no fines‖ in situ concrete and 
back again, according to the availability of materials and labour.  For others it became the 
system of choice.
73
   
 
 
INNOVATION, EVALUATION AND LOTS OF PREJUDICE 
Bowley argues that ‗most of the systems proposed, and still more those actually used, 
were fundamentally similar to those used in the inter-war period‘.  New methods were 
not new at all.  For her, perhaps the ‗greatest innovation‘ was ‗less in the actual methods 
and materials used, than in the development of the scientific assessment of 
performance.‘74  This offered the first objective technical standards against which 
performance could be measured (for example, thermal and sound insulation, resistance to 
fire and moisture penetration, stability, etc.).  But ‗neutral‘ state sponsored science also 
became an evaluating weapon through which non-traditional methodologies could be and 
were promoted.  Even before a detailed re-evaluation had commenced, science — in the 
form of the Building Research Station — spoke authoritatively about why earlier building 
systems had failed, and about its own current predictive powers to prevent such a 
physical reoccurrence.
75
  At the same time the BRS readily admitted to the paucity of 
information existing on costs and labour content for housing generally — ‗a remarkable 
dearth‘ of real systematic data: a major shortfall given that ‗cost or demand on human 
effort is one of the final criteria in deciding on the merit of a new or modified form of 
construction.‘76  Science was to fill such voids in ‗traditional knowledge‘: that which had 
served the industry ‗so well in the past‘, but was ‗no longer sufficient to meet the needs 
of modern conditions‘.77 
Thus, the BRS‘s publicly declared advice to architects was that, given the ‗large fund 
of scientific knowledge of the physical, mechanical and chemical properties of building 
materials the problem of the design of new methods of construction presented no 
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formidable obstacles.‘78  Such advice was disingenuous.  Privately the BRS was advising 
the Burt Committee, for example, that the performance of light steel framed houses was 
likely to be unpredictable after twenty-five years.  It similarly refused to vouch for the 
efficiency of jointing systems utilised unless they could be tested in advance over time.  
Nevertheless it was argued that the development of such houses for ‗immediate post-war 
use‘ should not be ‗prejudiced by certainties as to the ultimate length of life arising from 
either the corrosive or the jointing issue.‘79  Nor were jointing problems unique to steel 
houses.  Similar shortcomings were encountered with pre-cast concrete houses but were 
again controversially gilded over in favour of production immediately.
80
   
In re-evaluating non-traditional performance in the early 1950s, ministry officials 
referred to an immediate negative ‗legacy of the past‘.  Poor technical performance 
‗causing considerable trouble and expense in remedial measures‘ was one such failing, as 
were ‗slow completion‘ rates, extra costs and the widely held belief that ‗non-traditional 
houses were uglier that brick houses.‘81  In part this ignored the overall realities of the 
non-traditional versus traditional debate.  Delays were endemic at that time across the 
board.  Similarly, while non-traditional designs might ‗accentuate‘ some of the 
difficulties of poor estate layout, and were certainly thought of as ‗all looking alike‘, this 
was not a problem intrinsic or unique to them, but common on traditionally constructed 
estates too: ‗where all individuality and homeliness have been lost in endless rows of 
identical semi-detached houses.‘82  Nevertheless, such an overview offered an accurate 
measure of perception: as one Regional Housing Officer remarked there was an ‗array of 
snipers abroad‘, all ‗quick to seize upon and criticize any fault‘ in the non-traditional 
housing types.
83
  As Bevan acknowledged, he expected positive steps to be taken to 
‗encourage‘ public authorities to place orders for non-traditional housing and ‗to do 
everything possible to overcome the prejudice that still exists in all quarters against new 
building methods.‘84  That this was necessary reveals the large gap that existed between 
‗promoting‘ government agencies and local authority consumers; one that remained after 
teething problems with earlier, more unreliable systems had been overcome.  
It is useful also to contrast Bowley‘s postoperative view of the lack of technical 
innovation with that of contemporary advisors.  Addressing building employers at the end 
of 1949, the Director of Research at the Ministry of Works began by noting that ‗it had 
not been possible in the last thirty years for the building industry to provide a house at a 
rental within the means of the workers in the lower income groups.‘  Low-cost housing, 
he correctly summarised, ‗has had to be subsidised.‘85  He then outlined the recent 
advances made, continually contrasting these against a slow moving building industry 
‗firmly entrenched in traditional practice, … founded upon craftsmanship‘ and making 
materials fit on site.  ‗The new methods of production differ from the old‘, he stated, in 
that ‗by definition, every stage is planned and the whole process is in every case 
rigorously controlled by the requirements of production‘. 
 
The actuating theory has been that structural components should be made to accurate 
dimensions in factories and they should then be assembled on site with a minimum of 
labour.  In fact, the expected economies in labour have been achieved handsomely.  
The components have been made accurately and they have been assembled quickly 
and easily.
86
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Indeed, he concluded, ‗the pity of it all‘ was that such techniques had so far been limited 
only to the shell of the house, as he announced plans to fabricate completely the interiors 
and finishings in the factory also. 
There is no record of audience reaction to such claims, although it is unlikely to have 
been sympathetic because most contractors continued to favour traditional methods.
87
  It 
would have been less sympathetic still had the audience fully appreciated how radically 
estimates of man-hour savings then being presented to them had fallen from the initial 
figures that had first underpinned prefabrication policy.  As Bernal, then chairing the 
MOW Scientific Advisory Group, pointed out in early 1946: ‗It appears that much of the 
time-saving in certain types of prefabrication is more apparent than real.‘88  Again it was 
‗outstanding‘ houses like the Reema and Wates that were praised by the BRS: those 
predominately prefabricated off-site and thus most readily conforming to the ideal of 
factory methodology.  The government‘s report on non-traditional performance reminded 
its audience that success ‗depended on the basic principle of exploiting the machine to the 
full, assembling very rapidly on the site a number of accurately dimensioned units which 
require no elaborate fitting together.‘89  New methods, however, were still no cheaper 
than traditional forms of construction, and indeed only ‗no fines‘ offered immediate 
prime cost savings.
90
  Nevertheless the development of pre-cast concrete housing systems 
was to be dominated by a single theme: bigger panels incorporating an increasing number 
of functions (for example, a pre-finished internal skin).  The Reema and Wates systems 
were early exemplars.  As the BRS noted, it seemed reasonable ‗to make the units as 
large as the mechanical equipment can conveniently handle.‘91  Here we see a glimpse of 
the future.  Building high, the next stage, was always to be more expensive.  This led to 
the lowering of specifications and design standards in the utilitarian blocks of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Practical limits existed also to the economic size of off-site prefabricated 
units, and high factory-based overhead costs married uneasily with fluctuating demand.  
Moreover the efficiency claims made for systems construction as likely reflected more 
efficient site management structures than the system methodology per se.
92
   
 
Insert Wates (Figure 4) photo  
  
Such ante-dated realities sit uneasily with science‘s predictive confidence in the 
1940s.  And perhaps post-knowledge criticism is unfair. Well, not really.  The authority 
of such discourse was itself created initially by contrasting an earlier lack of knowledge 
with what was now ‗understood‘ about material behaviour and areas such as works study.  
Contemporaries also already suspected that productivity gains attributed to non-
traditionals were a product of better site organisation. Indeed the concluding remarks of 
the first Burt report of 1944 captured exactly this latter sentiment.
93
  When such questions 
were raised, however, the answer, although present in the analysis, was not one that was 
emphasised or headlined.   It remained buried, neutrally, in the main body text.
94
  We can 
contrast this ‗sleight of hand‘ against the emphasis taken by those major overarching 
enquiries into building efficiency at that time.  These virtually discounted the probability 
of gains coming from shell prefabrication or indeed from prefabrication generally.
95
  
Nevertheless, for politicians, science‘s role was axial; its course and agenda set.  Writing 
to Morrison, the Minster of Works put this perfectly.  All agreed on the ‗importance of 
research work in the field of building and civil engineering from the point of view of the 
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efficiency‘, and making ‗the most economical use of man-power and material as well as 
from the point of view of cost.‘   The ‗time has come when the underlying problem of 
modernising the building industry and putting pressure on it to become technically 
efficient will have to be faced.‘96  Indeed construction‘s very backwardness was publicly 
defined in terms of its reluctance, as an ‗ancient industry, rooted in tradition and craft 
practice‘, to adopt mechanisation and prefabrication — the products of scientific 
investigation.
97
  If we factor in the prostituted use of this broader scientific discourse 
through systems advertising and ‗neutral‘ technical reviews (where such language 
underlined manufacturers/designers claims), the rhetoric of science had a significant 
impact in promoting systems mentalities.
98
  But it also exacerbated the gap between the 
‗new‘ and ‗old‘, between traditional and non-traditional.  Thus, only in one sense did it 
aid understanding, and then only partially. 
Bowley, writing at the time of the later high-rise boom, acknowledges that, while 
most of the non-traditional low-rise systems used after 1945 were ‗fundamentally similar‘ 
to those used between the wars, there were what she terms ‗novelty‘ innovations.  
Included here was the use of the large pre-cast load-bearing panel (that is the Wates and 
Reema systems already noted), and of light-weight steel frame fabrication.  Most of the 
innovative steel frames solutions, she notes, failed to be developed — partly because 
government policy towards steel houses changed significantly due to post-war steel 
shortages.  Other ‗genuine innovations‘ could be found in the use of aluminium and 
plywood for the construction of internal and external skins.
99
  Some historians have been 
more generous.  Finnimore, for example, points out that the majority of non-traditional 
dwellings ‗used materials new to housing such as concrete, steel and laminates‘, noting 
again particularly those ‗systems which used the latest techniques in light weight steel 
fabrication.‘  He concludes that of ‗more impact than the real extent of mechanised 
production was the innovative nature of the materials and methods of construction 
used.‘100  Such praise requires obvious qualification because steel and concrete were 
central components of earlier inter-war systems.  Even those types noted as innovatory in 
their use of materials — like the BISF type of which over 31,000 were built — were 
modelled loosely on earlier inter-war types like the Dorlonco (itself then considered to be 
an ‗important technical step forward‘).101  For some house types, such as the steel 
prototype Braithwaite, it was the method of ‗clip‘ jointing that was deemed to be 
important.
102
  Indeed a frequently stated reason for the post-war ‗failure‘ — if such it was 
— of non-traditional housing was that it focussed on too many ‗novelty‘ individual 
private designs, so markets for each were correspondingly limited, when what was really 
needed was a broader trajectory of prefabrication and standardisation.
103
 
 
Insert photo‘s of BISF (Figure 5) and Woolaway (Figure 6) 
 
There is some sense to this.  Certainly the production of certain house types was 
driven forward by little but entrepreneurial enthusiasm, and this was really part of the 
infectious post-war hype associated with non-traditional methods.  The Woolaway — a 
pre-cast system — was one such: poorly reviewed in terms of its physical and design 
attributes, and lacking the necessary finance.  Even the Minister responsible recognised 
its limited potential: ‗only one of a hundred‘ such approved systems, and ‗not of any 
outstanding merit‘, but nevertheless encouraged as ‗a useful supplement to traditional 
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forms.‘  Only some 4,300 were eventually built before the company went bankrupt, and 
that after the government had already offered surety and actively manipulated the housing 
market to guarantee orders.
104
  Indeed, it is noteworthy that even after extra financial 
subsides were terminated by 1948, government agencies actively continued to manipulate 
the public housing market to support non-traditional producers.
105
  Nevertheless, certain 
types were popular; or, at the very least, less unpopular.   It was the larger, national 
companies that had fewer difficulties filling order books (again notably Wimpey and 
Laing, but to a lesser degree Wates), while the smaller, locally orientated producers like 
Reema and Spooner struggled to obtain a continuity of work, raising unit costs because of 
high central overheads.
106
  There were exceptions.  The Cornish Unit, of which over 
22,000 were built in the decade after 1945, proved popular in the south-west, partly 
because it was enthusiastically promoted by regional staff, partly because of the shortage 
of traditional builders in that area, but also because of its attractive, distinctive design: 
indeed Bevan wanted one as a country retreat.
107
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Customers (householders and local authorities) were noticeably less resistant to certain 
non-traditional designs after 1945 than they had been before 1939: meaning — how non-
traditionals were understood and contextualised — had changed.  Thus, there was a 
greater acceptance of certain house types that previously had been shunned.  
Nevertheless, limits still existed as to what was more and was less acceptable, measured 
against the cultural ‗gold standard‘ of traditional practice.  This ‗marked preference for 
the familiar in housing, for ―quality‖, whether real or imagined‘, meant, according to one 
housing historian, that the foremost ‗―problem‖ [facing non-traditional diffusion] was 
social and political, for unless all sections of the community could agree on the 
desirability of mass-produced houses as consumer goods, there could be no success‘.108  
Two points spring from this.  The first is an assumption that technological ‗meaning‘ and 
‗direction‘ had also been satisfactorily resolved.  The second revolves around the 
question of ‗consensus‘, as outlined above or in terms of an ‗end to controversy‘.  How 
should we measure it, how do we mark its attainment, is it a useful tool?  
Clearly there are quantitative and qualitative problems with both points.  With 
hindsight, we can judge that future trends in systems construction were to follow the 
paths favoured through late 1940s and early 1950s low-rise design.  That is preference 
would be given to large prefabricated concrete panels and, at the other extreme, cast in 
situ concrete housing.  The former was strongly advocated by scientific, technological 
and modernist architectural opinion, and was explicit in the ‗ideal‘ promoted by 
politicians (the paymasters of public housing) — that modernising a ‗backward‘ building 
industry involved the transfer of production from site to factory.  In situ construction, by 
contrast, fell outside this rubric.  Yet, ironically, it was here that customer resistance to 
changing consumption patterns was noticeably weaker.  Indeed here we find positive 
acceptance — or certainly significantly less controversy amongst the relevant social 
groups.  ‗No fines‘ construction in practice meant building a ‗traditional‘ house using 
non-traditional means, for the same or less money, more quickly, and with fewer 
problems in terms of labour and materials shortages.  Off site prefabrication, however, 
had a different meaning.  Initially, it represented standardisation and the manufacture of 
component parts for the industry as a whole.  But in terms of popular exposure — which 
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itself imparted important meaning — it signified whole house manufacture, and in terms 
of the implicit promises made: the mass production of houses.  This, if you like, was the 
rehearsed ‗dream‘ of publicists, manufacturers, modern architects.109 
This new ideal was widely misunderstood, and indeed widely misrepresented.  It is 
significant that even at times of acute housing shortages, customers at best subscribed to 
it only through a ‗better than nothing‘ mentality.  It was bitterly resisted, too, by the 
traditional industry — which rightly viewed it as a negative commentary on its own 
abilities — and by many architects.  Was this unimportant?  A consensus promoting 
prefabrication was unnecessary, it might be argued, because of the social authority of the 
groups supporting the proposition: those thought capable of legitimately speaking for the 
future (scientists, technologists, ideologues).  Consensus, anyway, is an ideal construct: a 
widespread willingness to agree through common understanding across social groups is 
in fact unlikely.  Perhaps then a better question to ask is to what degree, comparatively, 
was agreement reached — this being a less exacting requirement?   Even here, however, 
there was no end to controversy, no social closure.  The quality of conversation between 
consumer and producers remained, for the most part, marginal, and certainly not 
informing.  So solutions were imposed, rather than agreed.    No longer was successful 
innovation to be measured by an ability to mass-produce houses, but instead, the 
industrialisation of building simply meant that non-traditionals should be able to compete 
economically, using less skilled site labour.
110
  And, even against these more limited 
criteria, unanimity over prefabrication‘s achievements was lacking.  This is not to say 
that a future course of direction had not been established.  The largely unquestioned 
authority of science and technology, juxtaposed against continuing negative perceptions 
of traditional construction practice, continued to set the rules.  That this failed to achieve 
an overarching hegemonic control in the ten years after 1945 because of consumer 
resistance does not mean that this did not occur later.  But even then customers remained 
isolated, ignored, closure and stabilisation thwarted.  The results were the inadequate, 
inappropriate solutions of the 1960s and 1970s.   
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